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I cannot think of a better way to honor Frank Morris’s memory than
to have this kind of conference. One reason for Frank’s success as a
manager and as an economist was his willingness to listen and his respect
for other people’s opinions. If Frank were here, he would be taking notes.
I thought that was a very good paper, and I had very little
disagreement with it. I just want to elaborate on a couple of points.
Benjamin Friedman points out that one advantage of framing policy
decisions in terms of free reserves was the opportunity to duck respon-
sibility for changes in interest rates, on the grounds that the market sets
interest rates. “Nobody here but us chickens” has long been the Fed’s
response to complaints.
In the 1970s, the Fed responded to criticisms about management and
money supply by setting targets for both money growth and the federal
funds rate, but in practice until 1979 it usually hit the funds rate target
while often missing the money growth target. Frank Morris had some
monetarist leanings, although they seldom got in the way of his better
judgment. But at Board meetings when the staff reported the money
growth rate, Frank often expressed regret that the Fed had once again
failed to catch the monetary rabbit.
I will not spoil the party by giving a review of the 1970s. But ﬁnally,
after the second oil shock, Paul Volcker and his colleagues concluded that
drastic action was necessary. Their instrument was a very sharp rise in
interest rates, but the stated target was a money or reserve base growth
rate certain to produce a spike in interest rates. The money growth target
provided some cover, but the viability of the disinﬂation project ulti-
*Professor Emeritus, Harvard University.mately depended on public acceptance of the rate increase and the
resulting recession.
Postmortems of the inﬂation of the 1960s and 1970s are still being
held, and it is widely recognized that maintenance of price stability
requires public support for restrictive policy in response to supply shocks
or ﬁscal folly. Nominal anchors, gold standards, ﬁxed exchange rates, or
inﬂation targets may strengthen that support if it is already there. They
provide a sharply deﬁned basis for criticism of monetary policy, but by
themselves they do not create the necessary support for price stability,
and the history of nominal anchors is one of having one and dropping it.
Like second marriages, those devices represent the triumph of hope over
experience.
Let me turn now to another aspect of monetary management.
Friedman has a good deal to say about targets and objectives for
monetary policy, and I agree with most of what he says. However, the
discussion of the nominal anchor problem gives little attention to what I
think is the most difﬁcult nonpolitical problem of monetary management:
At any one time a monetary manager has to choose what to do in the
short term, in order to move to a feasible and satisfactory combination of
output and inﬂation.
The problem is complicated, to say the least, by three facts. First,
monetary policy, whether expressed in terms of money growth or interest
rates, works “with long and variable lags,” as Milton Friedman so wisely
said many years ago. Second, our forecasts of what will happen during
the lag periods are not very good, considering the record of the past few
years. Third, we should know what responses to expect from any change
or sequence of changes in monetary conditions.
If the Fed waits to take action until it is sure of its ground, higher
inﬂation or a recession may be well under way before the action has any
effect. If, to avoid that result, the Fed takes early action, it risks damaging
a healthy expansion by ﬁghting hypothetical inﬂation or, conversely,
accelerating a boom by ﬁghting a hypothetical recession. Those dangers
may be averted if the Fed follows a policy of moving interest rates
incrementally in the direction indicated by the forecast, with the size of
the increments related to the certainty of the forecast. Bob Solow has said,
“If you’re not sure where you’re going, you don’t go very fast.”
In the past few years, the Fed has acted that way, with small interest
rate changes. Fortunately, demand growth was quite steady, commodity
prices were stable or falling, and wages rose only gradually in spite of
increasingly tight labor markets. The situation required only the mildest
restrictive action by the Fed. Things worked out well even though our
forecasts were not very good.
The remarkable record of the last few years seems to have led not
only to irrational exuberance about the stock market, but to an irrational
faith in the power of monetary policy as well. A couple of weeks ago, I
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the Social Security surplus to repay federal debt would cause any serious
problems. He expressed complete conﬁdence that monetary policy had
the necessary power to offset any ﬁscal drag and that Chairman Green-
span would know how to use that power.
That vote of conﬁdence should be gratifying to Greenspan, but he
would be the ﬁrst to agree that more difﬁcult problems lie ahead. We may
have to deal with serious supply shocks or sharply rising demand.
Alternatively, there may be a fall in stock prices or a loss of conﬁdence in
the dollar. Do we know what we need to know to deal with those
situations?
To do the management job properly, we should know how to
forecast demand, how to forecast wages and prices given demand, and
how to predict the effect of monetary policy action taken today on
demand several months from now. Can we do those things? Judging
from recent forecasts, we cannot. We will have to continue to rely on
incremental responses in the direction indicated by the forecast. But
unless placid times come, money managers seeking to avoid the risks of
doing too little, too late, will have to take the risk of having to reverse
policy because they have done too much, too soon.
Friedman ends his review of Federal Reserve policymaking by
saying that we have returned to a world in which the central bank sets
interest rates, interest rates inﬂuence output, and output in part deter-
mines inﬂation. In many respects this is where Frank Morris entered in
1968. I must add, however, that the links between interest rates, output,
and inﬂation are no better understood today than in 1968. At the 1969
conference on controlling monetary aggregates, I gave a paper and
concluded that the limitations in our ability to quantify the effect of any
sequence of monetary actions had become apparent under the severe
pressures that had been at work during the past four years. We continue
to suffer from those limitations.
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